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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW YORK CIVIL SERVICE
LITIGATION
JULIUS LEVANTHALt
THE acts of administrative agencies increasingly impinge upon the
affairs of the average citizen. The assessment of a fine, the settle-
ment of a strike, the issuance of a license to pursue a livelihood often
depend today upon the decisions made by an extra-judicial board or
commission. Such decisions, when brought for review before the courts,
frequently require the consideration of principles of administrative law.
Yet courts and legal scholars alike have been slow to recognize this
recent off-shoot of public law.' However, the crises of the 1930's in
government and business led to the unprecedented growth of new and
powerful administrative agencies, such as the National Labor Relations
Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The sudden tre-
mendous role of these agencies demanded that their supervision by the
courts be uniform and restrained. This judicial supervision was largely
shaped by the new attention accorded administrative law in the decisions
of the courts.
In less spectacular fashion, administrative agencies have long been
functioning in the domains of public personnel management. The lusty
growth of civil service agencies in the reform decades around the turn
of the century long preceded the earliest effective recognition of adminis-
trative law by the courts. Therefore, in civil service cases some judges
consulted the restraints of administrative law only in fragmentary
fashion and without consistent effort to tie their decisions into the whole
pattern of this developing branch of public law. Evidences of this atti-
- Member of the New York Bar.
1. In an article, Professor (now Supreme Court Justice) Felix Frankfurter pointed
out, "Traditional disregard of the existence of administrative law by bench and bar would
have been sufficient restraint against its fruitful development. Unfortunately not only was
it neglected, but, being deemed hostile to the Common Law, its very existence was denied"
and, in a further passage, "To this day administrative law has no rubric in the ordinary
digests, and flickering cross-references to the subject first begin to appear in 220 United
States Reports. Not until 280 United States Reports does *the term appear to have estab-
lished itself in the index..... Digests and indices may not have caught up with fact,
but the Supreme Court is certainly aware that a great stream of public law is flowing not
entirely through the courts." Frankfurter, Foreword to a Discussion of Current Develop-
ments in Administrative Law (1938) 47 YAmE L. J. 515.
2. A clear picture of the quasi-judicial functions of contemporary administrative
agencies is given in CHAmnERAw, Dowuwo, HAYEs, TE Jvoncmi Fuscnion3 FEin um
An7saA pn.A AGEaclEs (New York, The Commonwealth Fund, 1942). For an earlier
statement of the importance of administrative law, see Frankfurter, The Task of Admin-
istrative Law (1927) 75 U. o: PA. L. R v. 614.
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tude are still found in civil service decisions today. But the last twenty
years have witnessed an unprecedented expansion in civil service systems
throughout the nation.3 This expansion, temporarily retarded by the
war, promises a mighty resumption in this period of reconversion and
makes urgent a clear recognition of the place of administrative law in
civil service, and of the importance of upholding administrative dis-
cretion wherever properly exercised.
This article will attempt to show the essential similarity of the princi-
ples of administrative law in the field of civil service with those in other
fields in which better known administrative agencies function. A glimpse
at decisions dealing with the various functions of the New York Civil
Service Commissions may bring into dearet focus the pervading influ-
ence of administrative law in public personnel operations., To render
clearer the technical processes involved in civil service operation, we
shall trace the usual course of an examination for a position in the com-
petitive class. This study will take us from the initial placing of a posi-
tion into the competitive class, through the setting of experience, age,
and other requirements, past the preparing and administering of the
various oral, written, and other tests, up to the establishing and use of
the resulting eligible lists. Perhaps we shall then more clearly realize
3. The following pre-war estimates are taken from Civil Service Agencies in the
United States, Pamphlet No. 16, Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada
(1940). The upper row of figures indicates the total number of employees in the federal
and all state, county, and municipal civil service systems (exclusive of public education
employees, such as teachers, etc.). The lower row indicates the total number of public
education employees for the same years.
1929 1933 1936 January, 1940
2,146,000 2,153,000 2,542,000 3,246,000 to 3,421,000
1,102,000 1,182,000 1,200,000 1,208,000
During World War II, the federal civil service expanded tremendously, presenting an
exception to the static condition of state and local civil service systems. In the article
Civil Service in War Time (1941) 58 GOOD GovEm = 45, appears the statement, "On
top of the great increase in the federal payrolls between 1932 and 1939-an increase of
about 60%-the rise in federal employment since the outbreak of the present World War
has been over 425,000, an increase of about 50%, as against an increase of no more than
8% in the three years immediately preceding our entry into the first World War."
THE M To my RE ORT or ELaomExT (1945) (Executive Branch of the Federal Gov-
ernment), issued, by the United States Civil Service Commission, gives a total of 2,908,912
employees as of June 30, 1944 in the federal service alone.
4. This article will discuss primarily cases dealing with the powers exercised by the
New York City Civil Service Commission, including classification, examining, etc. In New
York City, the powers of appointment, assignment, and dismissal are vested in depart-
ment heads and not in the Civil Service Commission and hence will be treated only in-
directly herein. See FIELD, CrvIL SEavicE LAw (1939) for a general discussion of the vari-
ous powers of other civil service commissions.
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that the cautions on judicial restraint urged by Justice Brandeis in a rate
fixing case, apply with equal force to civil service litigation:
"The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have
some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether
the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly. To
that extent, the person asserting a right, whatever its source, should be en-
titled to the independent judgment of a court on the ultimate question of con-
stitutionality. But supremacy of law does not demand that the correctness of
every finding of fact to which the rule of law is to be applied shall be subject to
review by a court. If it did, the power of courts to set aside findings of fact
by an administrative tribunal would be broader than their power to set aside
a jury's verdict."5
The Jurisdictional Classification Process
The various civil service commissions in New York state exercise
jurisdiction over positions in the classified service. These positions are
grouped into four classes: (1) the exempt class, reserved for policy-
making or confidential positions, (2) the competitive class, containing all
positions for which competition is adjudged practicable, (3) the non-
competitive class and (4) the labor class. The latter two classes include
principally positions of lower grade for which competitive examination
is deemed impracticable.
The New York State Constitution commands competitive examina-
tion for, and consequently competitive classification of, positions wher-
ever practicable.6 In the absence of legislative mandate. the decision as
5. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 84 (1938). (Italics added).
Dean James M. Landis has proposed the expertness of administrators as justification for
close restraint of judicial review. "The power of judicial review under our traditions of
government lies with the courts because of a deep belief that the heritage they hold makes
them experts in the synthesis of design. Such difficulties as have arisen have come because
courts cast aside that role to assume to themselves expertness in matters of industrial
health, utility engineering, railroad management, even bread baking. The rise of the ad-
ministrative process represented the hope that policies to shape such fields could most ad-
equately be developed by men bred to the facts. That hope is still dominant, but its
possession bears no threat to our ideal of the 'supremacy of law.'" LADIS, THE ADanus-
TRATIVE PROCESS (1938) 154. A similar position is taken by James Hart in an article,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1941) 9 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 4Q0. See also Frank-
furter, The Task of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. oF PA. L. REV. 614.
6. Art. 5, § 6 of the New York State Constitution provides: "Appointments and pro-
motions in the civil service of the state, and of all the civil divisions thereof, including cities
and villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, so far as prac-
ticable, by examinations, which, so far as practicable, shall be competitive. . . ." The con-
stitutions or statutes of several other states require competitive classification wherever
practicable. See FIELD, op. cit. supra, note 4, c. IV. Under this constitutional provisions
and related statutes, the New York Courts are sometimes confronted with the preliminary
[Vol. 15
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to practicability of examination is made by the civil service commission
having jurisdiction. Obviously this right of decision is a powerful in-
strument in the maintenance of the merit system and should be protect-
ed against improper invasion by the legislature or even the courts. Here
administrative law sometimes furnishes a ready bulwark by demanding
that discretions exercised by the personnel agency be sustained unless
clearly arbitrary or unreasonable.
An early New York case on the classifying power, People ex rel. Sckau
v. McWilliams,7 warns of the perplexities courts occasionally create for
themselves because of eagerness to create broad precedents of review.
In several previous decisions,' the New York courts had declared classi-
fication a quasi-judicial function, the exercise of which was fully re-
viewable by certiorari as a question of law. But in the Sckau case, test-
ing the competitive classification of the position of Battalion Chief in
the Buffalo Fire Department, the Court of Appeals upset precedent
and warned:
"If it should appear that there was a plain violation by the commission of
its duty to classify as competitive an office which was clearly and manifestly
so, there should be a remedy in the courts. But there is necessarily a large
debatable field as to cases within which there will be great differences of
opinion even among the most intelligent and fair-minded men, and as to this
field it seems to me that it is not reasonable that the judgment of an appellate
question of determining whether services rendered for a governmental authority are con-
tractual in character and therefore not subject to civil service requirements. Thus in Turel
v. Delaney, 285 N. Y. 16, 32 N. E. (2d) 774 (1941), the Court of Appeals ordered the
New York City Board of Transportation to discontinue the employment of physicians on
a contractual basis and to replace them with eligibles from an appropriate civil service
list. However, in Civil Service Technical Guild v. LaGuardia, 181 Misc. 492, 44 N. Y. S.
(2d) 860 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 860, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 114 (lst Dep't 1944),
aff'd without opinion, 292 N. Y. 586, 55 N. E. (2d) 49 (1944) and Matter of Hardecker
v. New York City Board of Education, 180 Misc. 1008, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 855 (Sup. Ct.
1943), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 980, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 959 (2d Dep't 1943), aff'd without
opinion, 292 N. Y. 584, 55 N. E. (2d) 49 (1944), the courts approved the employment of
private engineering firms for the planning of post-war projects. And in Beck v. Board of
Education of City of New York, 268 App. Div. 644, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 712 (2d Dep't 1945),
rev'g, 182 Misc. 886, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 19 (Sup. Ct. 1944) the courts permitted public
school custodians, themselves civil service appointees, to hire custodial assistants without
referring to civil service lists.
7. 185 N. Y. 92, 77 N. E. 785 (1906). For a discussion of this case, see Tharaud,
Administrative Laws, Discretion of Civil Service Commission Mandamus: Certiorari (1931)
17 CoRN. L. Q. 103. Also see Matter of Simons v. McGuire, 204 N. Y. 253, 97 N. E.
526 (1912).
8. Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N. Y. 345, 46 N. E. 857 (1897); People ex tel. Sweet v.
Lyman, 157 N. Y. 368, 52 N. E. 132 (1898); People ex rel. Sims v. Collier, 175 N. Y. 196,
67 N. E. 309 (1903).
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court should be substituted for that of the commissioners. Yet, if the action
of the civil service commission is to be reviewed by certiorari, there seems to
be no escape from the conclusion that ultimately the classification of every
officer or employee in the service of the state, or its political subdivisions,
must be determined by this court..."9
The decision then declared classification an administrative, not a
quasi-judicial, function and reviewable, by mandamus, only in instances
of abuse of discretion.' Since enactment of Article 78 of the New York
Civil Practice Act," reducing procedural distinctions among the several
special remedies (mandamus, certiorari and prohibition), courts must be
more alert to the substantive merits of civil service litigation. The Schau
decision, although resting on somewhat subtle procedural distinctions,
did encourage judicial restraint and helped thereby to ease the grow-
ing pains of the youthful public personnel agencies in New York state.'
Especially where buttressed by some allegedly relevant statute, claims
of confidential duties are often urged to gain exemption for a position.3
9. People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N. Y. 92, 98, 77 N. E. 785, 786 (1906).
For a recent case illustrating the self-imposed restraint of the courts in the absence of
arbitrarily exercised classification power, see Matter of Miller v. Bromley, 184 Misc. 676,
54 N. Y. S. (2d) 209 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
10. Mandamus is ordinarily available only to compel a public officer to perform a minis-
terial duty involving no exercise of discretion or to correct a clear abuse of discretion. See
Miguel v. McCarI, 291 U. S. 442 (1934); Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 80 N. E.
821 (1907); Heeran v. Scully, 254 N. Y. 344, 173 N. E. 7 (1930).
11. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT, Art. 78 §§1283-1306. See GEL.noaR, ADnan.sRaATm LAW,
CASES Axm CoiniNrrs (1940) Appendix III, Statutory Revision of Certiorari and Manda-
mus Procedure in New York for the text of this statute and the explanatory comments of
the New York Judicial Council which framed the report on the law as proposed, entitled
Proposed Simplification of the Remedies of Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, printed
as Leg. Doc. No. 48 (d) (1937). Proceedings against the New York City Civil Service
Commission tinder Art. 78 are usually instituted in Special Term of the Supreme Court,
First Department. Appeals may then be taken to the Appellate Division, First Department,
and finally to the Court of Appeals.
12. Some idea of the ramifying activities of the New York City Civil Service Commis-
sion may be gleaned from its 56th, 57th, 58th Annual Reports covering the period January
1, 1939 to June 30, 1943, which describe the placing of over 99.6% of the city's employees
under the merit system, including competitive classification of 12,000 former labor em-
ployees in the Dep't of Sanitation and of 27,000 former labor employees of the private
transit lines now municipally owned; the intensive use of such scientific testing devices
as the practical test, the technical oral, the objective or short answer written test; the ex-
panded use of effective recruiting devices such as the radio and an official magazine,
THE BuxrE a r, also the post-entry training of thousands of city employees by the Com-
missioner's Bureau of Training, later the Division of War Training (now discontinued).
13. Though neither the Constitution nor Civil Service Law of New York specifies the
confidential duties of a position as a reason for exemption, several decisions have estab-
lished this principle. See Scabil v. Drzewucki, 269 N. Y. 343, 199 N. E. 506 (1936); Chit-
tenden v. Wurster, 152 N. Y. 345, 46 N. E. 857 (1897).
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But judges and personnel administrators alike should be alert to protect
a genuinely competitive position against ill-founded pleas for exempt
status. In a recent case, 4 clerks and deputy clerks in the various dis-
tricts of the New York City Municipal Court sought to annul the trans-
fer of their positions from the exempt to the competitive class. Reliance
was placed by them upon Section 13 of the State Civil Service Law
which permits the exemption of "One clerk, and one deputy clerk if au-
thorized by law, of each court.. ."' and upon the contention that each
district of the Municipal Court is historically an independent court.
The Court of Appeals reversed unanimous lower court sanction for these
arguments and held the claims of exemption untenable, ruling that perti-
nent statutes prove the Municipal Court a unit. The Court of Appeals
further indicated that competitive classification by a civil service com-
mission must prevail even against exemption-if unreasonable-by the
legislature.
"There must be something, as indicated in the Chittenden case,' 6 in the
nature of the duties which makes the service either one of confidence or else
of such importance that personal selection instead of competitive examination
is for the best interests of the public and the fulfillment of the particular
duties. In other words, the Legislature cannot act arbitrarily and exempt
places from competitive examination at will.'
1 7
This dictum demonstrates a commendable intent to hold the judgments
of civil service agencies unassailable, except for good cause, by other
branches of government.
In a later case, the Magistrates Court of New York City was also held
to be a single court and its district clerks were likewise denied the exemp-
14. Matter of Freidman v. Finegan, 243 App. Div. 689, 277 N. Y. Supp. 947 (1st Dep't
1935), rev'd, 268 N. Y. 93, 196 N. E. 755 (1935).
15. N. Y. Civ. Sanvica LAw § 13, subd. 3.
16. Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N. Y. 345, 46 N. E. 857 (1897).
17. Matter of Freidman v. Finegan, 268 N. Y. 93, 98, 196 N. E. 755, 756 (1935), rev'g,
243 App. Div. 689, 277 N. Y. Supp. 947 (1st Dep't 1935). The Court of Appeals pointed
out that no evidence had been produced by petitioners to show the confidential charac-
ter of the position. In an earlier case, Matter of O'Keefe v. Clark, 238 App. Div. 175, 264
N. Y. Supp. 299 (3d Dep't 1933), the Appellate Division had ruled that Assistant Clerks of
Districts of the same Municipal Court were not confidential employees merely because of
services rendered to poor litigants who appeared in person and stated that the confidential
relationship must exist between the employee and the appointing officer. In People ex rel.
Sweet v. Lyman, 157 N. Y. 368, 387, 52 N. E. 132, 139 (1898), the court declared: "Surely
the civil service commission cannot change the actual status of a position by declaring
one which is actually confidential not to be so, nor is it vested with power to repeal a
valid statute or to practically annul it by declaring a position to be competitive when the
law has provided otherwise, and the position is plainly of a strictly confidential character."
19461
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tions of Section 13.1I Here the Appellate Division commented:
"It does not appear that the act of the municipal civil service commission
in classifying the position of clerk was arbitrary. On the contrary, the deci-
sion was arrived at after very full hearings and study of briefs." 9
The presentation of adequately documented arguments as in this case
might do much to increase the prestige of civil service agencies in the
courts and to win ampler recognition of administrative immunities. In
his significant study of the administrative process, Landis has cautioned:
"The test of the judicial process generally is not the fair disposition of the
controversy. It is the fair disposition of the controversy upon the record as
made by the parties.
'20
Duties Classification
To insure equitable treatment of employees, closely related positions
in the competitive class are, in many jurisdictions, arranged in grades
according to salary and responsibility.2 ' This process of grading is
termed duties classification as distinguished from the jurisdictional classi-
fication already discussed. A recent decision highlights the equal signi-
ficance of administrative law in the guidance of judicial review of this
function. To remedy inequities of salary and assignment caused by the
18. Matter of Volgenau v. Finegan, 163 Misc. 554, 296 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Sup. Ct.
1937), aff'd, 250 App. Div. 757, 295 N. Y. Supp. 758 (1st Dep't 1937). See Matter of
Malloy v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 11, 1940, p. 1046, col. 3 (the so-called "Condemnation
Court," held part of the Supreme Court and petitioner denied exempt status as a clerk
in such tribunal).
19. Matter of Volgenau v. Finegan, 163. Misc. 554, 564, 296 N. Y. Supp. 101, Ill (Sup.
Ct. 1937). The absorption of the temporary relief agencies in New York City into the De-
partment of Welfare involved interesting problems in classification. In Aversa v. Finegan,
275 N. Y. 512, 11 N. E. (2d) 320 (1937), the Court of Appeals denied any power in the
Legislature to place the position of social investigator, for which competitive examination
was adjudged practicable, outside the civil service system. An earlier decision, Matter
of Social Investigator Eligibles Association v. Taylor, 268 N. Y. 233, 197 N. E. 262 (1935),
approving retention of Welfare Department employees who had no civil service status, was
distinguished on the ground that such employees were actually relief recipients, rendering
services in exchange, and not holders of any offices in civil service in the sense intended
by the constitution or the Civil Service Law. See also More Civil Service-The Power of
the New York Legislature and Civil Service Commissions to Reclassify Positions into the
Competitive Class and Cover-in Incumbents Without Competitive Examination (1940)
17 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 437.
20. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) at 38. See also Stason, "Substantial
Evidence" in Administrative Law (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1026-1051.
21. See FIELD, CIVIL SERVICE LAw (1939) 51 for a discussion of this classification func-
tion.
22. Matter of Beggs v. Kern, 172 Misc. 556, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 342 (Sup. Ct. 1939); aff'd
[Vol. 15
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mushrooming of the city's social agencies during the depression, the
New York City Civil Service Commission, in a series of resolutions,
established a graded social service in various city departments. All but
the lowest of the grades in this service were specifically reserved for
supervisory or other specialized positions. The last in this series of
resolutions contained the provision:
"All persons of the title of Social Investigator, who are affected by this
resolution, shall continue in such title with salaries, present duties and status
unaffected and unimpaired by this reclassification. Promotion lists presently
in existence will continue to be certified for appropriate positions in the new
classification." 23
By this clause the Commission sought to protect the rights of social
investigators whose salaries exceeded the ceiling established for non-
supervisory employees. Nevertheless, citing the Commission rule that
salary determines grade,24 the social investigators affected requested
transfer to the higher supervisory grades of the newly established social
service classification. The lower courts granted this request. The Court
of Appeals reversed and after directing the Commission to create some
appropriate title within the graded service for the petitioners explained:
".... but the courts may not require the Commission to confer upon the
incumbents of the ungraded positions rights and benefits to which they would
not otherwise be entitled and which in the opinion of the Commission would
work injury to the administration of the city's affairs."'25
Eligibility Requirements
Let us assume a position has been placed in the competitive class and
an examination has been ordered. Who will be allowed to compete?
without opinion, 258 App. Div. 1049, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 740 .(lst Dep't 1940), modified,
284 N. Y. 504, 32 N. E. (2d) 529 (1940). Matter of Brennan v. Kern, 284 N. Y. 810, 29
N. E. (2d) 926 (1940).
23. Resolutions adopted September 21, 1938, subd. (a), as quoted in Matter of Beggs
v. Kern, 284 N. Y. 504, 509, 32 N. E. (2d) 529, 531 (1940).
24. Rule V, § 4a of the Rules of the New York City Civil Service Commission states,
"The compensation of a position shall determine the grade of such position." In Matter of
Burri v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 841, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 942 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd
without opinion, 291 N. Y. 776, 53 N. E. (2d) 242 (1944), the courts ruled that a reduction
in the maximum salaries of various grades of Public Health Nurse effected a classification
change requiring approval of the Mayor and the State Civil Service Commission. And in
Matter of Talbot v. Board of Education of City of New York, 171 Misc. 974, 14 N. Y. S.
(2d) 362 (Sup. Ct. 1939), an inter-departmental transfer to a position with a higher maxi-
mum salary was disapproved. The court so ruled though the entering salary was less
than the maximum of the position from which transfer was sought.
25. Matter of Beggs v. Kern, 284 N. Y. 504, 514, 32 N. E. (2d) 529, 534 (1940).
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The Commission sets the requirements in the first instance, but some-
times the courts-and they may not agree among themselves-decide
who will eventually be allowed to take the examination. Occasionally
judges thereby create more embarrassments than they resolve. Here too
administrative law may exercise its saving powers by commanding
greater judicial tolerance for the judgments exercised by personnel
agencies.
A recent case26 involved the right of the New York State Civil Service
Commission to impose requirements of specialized experience for at-
torney applicants in an examination for Unemployment Insurance
Referee and to set a weight of 60 for "training, experience and general
qualifications." The lower courts ruled the experience requirement arbi-
trary and the subject of training, experience and general qualifications
not competitive, because no reviewable standards of rating had been
announced. The Appellate Division directed admission of attorneys with
five years of experience in general practice, and the elimination of the
provision of a weight of 60 for training, experience and general quali-
fications. On further appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled the experience
requirement for attorneys not arbitrary on its face and ordered trial of
its reasonableness. The soundness of such an order appears questionable.
Administrative agencies are not ordinarily required to prove the reason-
ableness of their actions. A dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals
is helpful here.
"The Commission need not show the reasonableness of its determination. It
it is only where the administrative board errs as a matter of law by arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable action that the courts may intervene."
27
A dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division had previously called at-
tention to weaknesses inherent in judicial defining of eligibility limits.
"Overlooking for a moment the assumption of legislative and executive
functions by the judiciary, why is the favored class limited to lawyers? Why
should it not include law clerks and scriveners of experience, insurance agents
who have had to do with workmen's compensation and comparable types of
insurance, labor union officials and employers with experience along the same
line? '"28
26. Matter ofCowen v. Reavy, 171 Misc. 266, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 830 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
determination confirmed, 258 App. Div. 994, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 519 (3d Dep't 1940); modi-
fied, 283 N. Y. 232, 28 N. E. (2d) 390 (1940). For a discussion of this case, see Note (1940)
18 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 114.
27. Id. at 240, 28 N. E. (2d) at 394. In Matter of Battista v. Vladeck, 182 Misc. 49,
43 N. Y. S. (2d) 291 (Sup. Ct. 1943) a saving clause in the advertisement for the examina-
tion, reading ". . . or a satisfactory equivalent" was held to reserve to the Commission dis-
cretion as to the types of education or experience to be considered acceptable.
28. Matter of Cowen v. Reavy, 258 App. Div. 994, 996, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 519, 522 (3d
[VOL 15
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Surprisingly enough, the courts today sometimes appear less cordial
to the recognition of administrative prerogative in certain aspects of civil
service administration than were judges of an earlier decade. Partly, at
least, this is due to the weak anchorage of administrative law in civil
service jurisprudence. Thus age requirements occasionally face rough
weather in the courts. In an early case, People ex rel. Moriarity v.
Creelman, the Court of Appeals, reversing a lower court decision,
approved a minimum age requirement of twenty-five in an examination
for inspector in the New York City Fire Department. The court ex-
plained:
"In the absence of some express limitation the action of the commission in
fixing such tests must stand, unless it is so clearly irrelevant and unreasonable
as to be palpably indefensible and improper. If any fair, reasonable argument
may be made to sustain the action the courts should not interfere, even though
they may differ from the commission as to its advisability."30
But more recently, the Supreme Court, although citing the Moriarity
case, disapproved a maximum age of twenty-five in an examination for
clerk of entering grade in New York City service.31 This age limit had
been set after study of comparable requirements in the career services
of England and other European countries and upon the recommenda-
tion of various personnel authorities. Evidence was adduced by the
Commission to show that the position, though comparatively simple in
its duties, was a stepping stone to higher offices entailing wide adminis-
trative responsibilities and calling for lengthy experience 2
Dep't 1940). Disapproval of the weight of 60 for experience, training and personal quali-
fications appears hasty. Matter of Fink v. Finegan, 270 N. Y. 356, 1 N. E. (2d) 462 (1936),
relied upon here, holds that a test, when administered, must contain reviewable standards
of rating. The further ruling of the Cowen case that the requirements improperly discrim-
inated against attorneys not graduates of law schools likewise seems unwarranted. The
courts, it is true, regulate admission to the bar but civil service commissions should be free
to decide where experience may be substituted for education in civil service examinations.
29. 206 N. Y. 570, 100 N. E. 446 (1912), rev'g, 152 App. Div. 147, 136 N. Y. Supp. 811
(1st Dep't 1912).
30. Id. at 576, 100 N. E. 446, 448.
31. Matter of Ryan v. Finegan, 166 Misc. 548, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd,
253 App. Div. 713, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 643 (1st Dep't 1937). In Matter of Laverty v. Finegan,
249 App. Div. 411, 292 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 275 N. Y. 555, 11 N. E.
(2d) 752 (1937), age limits of 21 to 45 in an examination for chief life guard were approved.
32. A recent statute, N. Y. Civil Service Law (1938) § 25a forbids exclusion of ". .. any
person who is physically and mentally qualified from competing, participating or register-
ing for a civil service competitive or promotional examination or from qualifying for a posi-
tion in the classified civil service by reason of his or her age." Exceptions are permitted in
the case of "... positions such as policeman, fireman, prison guard, or other positions which
require extraordinary physical effort, except when age limits for such positions are already
prescribed by law."
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Test Content
In recent years, decisions have also scrutinized the content and rating
of oral and written tests, although the New York courts, in early cases,
had declined to examine into the merits of civil service examinations'.
Thus, in upholding the legality of a mental and physical test for Police
Inspector, the Appellate Division (in 1901) had explained:
"The examination is by statute required to be competitive, and the whole
basis upon which a competitive examination rests would be swept away if a
person who had failed upon such an examination were allowed to prove in
court or before a jury that his rating should have been different from that
awarded to him."'33
In other early cases, the court spoke similarly.3 4
Fink v. Finnegan5 marks the first real drifting of the New York courts
from the restraints of these early decisions. Ira Fink, a candidate for
city medical officer in the New York City Service, passed the written
test but was failed at the oral interview, although answering technical
questions in medicine correctly. The oral examiners reported, as reason
for failure, that Fink lacked "executive ability and force", was "alto-
gether too mild" and would not make an acceptable Police Surgeon and
Medical Officer. The Court of Appeals ruled the appraisal of personality
traits not a legal competitive test because of the absence of objective
and reviewable rating standards.3 6 The decision then declared that
33. Matter of Allaire v. Knox, 62 App. Div. 29, 34, 70 N. Y. Supp. 845, 848 (1st Dep't
1901), aff'd, 168 N. Y. 642, 61 N. E. 1127 (1901). In other jurisdictions, decisions reflect the
adherence to narrow limits of review enunciated in the earlier New York decisions. See
Maxwell v. Civil Service Commission, 169 Cal. 336, 146 Pac. 871 (1915); Pratt v. Rosen-
thal, 181 Cal. 158, 183 Pac. 542 (1919); Mitchell v. McKevitt, 128 Cal. 458, 17 P. (2d)
789 (1932); Jones v. State, 39 Ohio App. 264, 177 N. E. 507 (1930).
34. People ex rel. Braisted v. McCooey, 100 App. Div. 240, 91 N. Y. Supp. 436 (1st
Dep't 1905) (rating of written test held not reviewable in absence of charges of bad faith
or illegal action). In People ex rel. Buckley v. Roosevelt, 19 App. Div. 431, 432, 46 N. Y.
Supp. 517, 518 (1st Dep't 1897) (motion for certiorari to review service rating by police
board denied), the Appellate Division stated: "Certain power is given to such examiners to
test the qualifications of the applicants for public office, and the method of such examina-
tion, with the result arrived at, in the exercise of the judgment of the examiners, upon the
examination had before them, must necessarily rest within their discretion, and is not a
judicial determination of the question presented to them." See also Matter of Darling v.
Maguire, 70 Misc. 597, 129 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1911); People ex rel. Caridi v. Creel-
man, 150 App. Div. 746, 135 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1st Dep't 1912).
35. 270 N. Y. 356, 1 N. E. (2d) 462 (1936). The Court of Appeals held that if the
test were intended to be qualifying and not competitive, prior announcement that it would
be included in the examination should have been made.
36. The Commission contended the test was properly competitive and attempted to
show legality by evidence that the examiners possessed a mental image of the ideal candi-
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oral tests are most properly employed to determine intelligence or
speech qualities. However, civil service commissioners are constantly
compelled to employ oral tests to evaluate personal traits, such as judg-
ment or tact, especially for administrative or high professional positions.
In a later case, Matter of Sloat v. Board of Examiners,3 7 the Court of
Appeals was asked to determine the legality of an oral test for a teach-
ing position. Although the test admittedly evaluated both personality
and speech qualifications, the Court predicated its decision upon ap-
proval of the criteria of speech alone. As for the perplexing problem
of personality evaluation, the decision simply stated:
"It would be impossible to formulate a standard by which such qualities may
be defined or measured with entire objectivity. The law does not require the
impossible or forbid the reasonable."
The Court merely suggested ". . . estimates of qualities which, it is
reasonably clear, affect the merit and fitness ... and... tests calculated
reasonably to show those qualities."3 s Where civil service agencies make
earnest attempts to comply with the law as still thus hazily sketched
out, judicial review should be tolerant. Part of the answer lies in a
conscious systematizing and perfecting of test procedures by personnel
agencies to obtain objectivity and fairness for all candidates.
Two recent cases reveal other aspects of the problem of judicial defi-
nition of the prerogatives of civil service commissions in the administra-
tion of examinations. Experiments have shown that essay tests yield
varying ratings even though graded by competent examiners.3 9 Yet, in
a recent examination for promotion in the Buffalo police force, the
Supreme Court rejected the grade given the candidate and directed that
a higher rating computed by itself be substituted. 4° The lack of an
date, that such concept was reinforced by the appearance of several highly rated candidates
and that, in any event, no test can be entirely objective. For a description of some proced-
ures now employed to reduce the subjective element in oral testing, see Sheed, Fair Play in
Oral Testing (1940) 2 THE MERIT MAN 18. The author mentions such procedures as prepa-
ration and conduct of tests by skilled examiners, careful planning and use of predetermined
main questions, prior determination of qualities needed for position, testing only for
qualities announced in advertisement.
37. 274 N. Y. 367, 9 N. E. (2d) 12 (1937), aff'g, 249 App. Div. 724, 292 N. Y. Supp.
994 (1st Dep't 1936).
38. Id. at 373, 9 N. E. (2d) at 15.
39. WOOD, MEASUREMENT IN HIimR EUCATiO N (1923) 143, in which a survey is men-
tioned which shows that various teachers had rated an examination paper in American
History with grades varying from 43 percent to 90 and that other teachers had rated an
examination paper in plane geometry with grades varying from 28 to 92.
40. Matter of Quinn v. Streeter, 174 Misc. 1073, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 546 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
175 Misc. 932, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 932, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 916 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Cf. Thompson
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objective rating key and the review of the candidate's appeal by the
rating examiner were held fatal defects under the dictum of the Fink
case. But actual rerating appears more properly the function of the com-
mission, not of the court.4'
Another decision emphasizes the need for judicial awareness of the
sociological forces that may motivate the construction of examina-
tions.' In an examination for patrolman, the New York City Commis-
sion granted small added credit for relevant educational courses and for
training in organized athletics, amateur or professional. Statements by
former Mayor LaGuardia, Governor Dewey (then District Attorney)
and excerpts from the Report of the National Committee on Law Ob-
servance and Enforcement were offered to show the value of technical
training and physical fitness in coping with modem crime. The lower
courts held these extra credits invalid. The Court of Appeals, however,
overruled and declared these credits were not an arbitrary bonus,
especially since they were computed before disclosure of candidates'
identities and given to those successful in the various tests comprising
the examination. The Court of Appeals commented:
"An enlightened public interest demands that professional men be educated
in the duties of their professions. In the Police Department educational train-
ing and training in organized athletics are required not only because of the
availability of modern inventions and free education to persons without charac-
ter who plan and engage in organized crime and, therefore, compel equally
well-trained patrolmen to cope with them, but because under the system of
promotion in the New York Police Department all officers must be taken from
the ranks."43
Revision of Announced Standards
An established tenet of administrative law confirms the indispensable
right of administrative agencies to alter announced judgments or stand-
v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., May 6, 1941, p. 2021, col. 4; Saltzman v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., March 4,
1941, p. 978, col. 3; Matter of Konieczny v. Streeter, 182 Misc. 376, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 820
(Sup. Ct. 1943), appeal dismissed, - App. Div. -, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 752 (4th Dep't 1944).
In these latter cases the courts approved the manner of rating examinations.
41. In Matter of Bruno v. Kern, 174 Misc. 958, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 272 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
the Supreme Court rejected the Commission's official key answer to a question of multiple-
choice type. And in Matter of Miller v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., January 4, 1941, p. 49, col. 7 the
court disapproved a written test for stenographer and steno-typist consisting of fifty multi-
ple-choice type questions, of which twenty pertained to steno-type. The decision held
the test discriminated against stenographers although candidates were required to answer
any twenty-five of the questions.
42. Matter of Thomas v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 13, 1939, p. 189, col. 5, aff'd without
opinion, 256 App. Div. 909, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 409 (1st Dep't 1939), rev'd, 280 N. Y. 236, 20
N. E. (2d) 738 (1939).
43. Id. at 243, 20 N. E. (2d) at 740.
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ards where unforseeable circumstances so require. The application of
this principle in civil service test review has sometimes appeared a vex-
ing problem for the courts. In Matter of Immediato v. Kern,44 printed
instructions in an essay test for promotion to foreman in the New York
City Department of Sanitation had directed candidates to answer only
one of three essay questions. However, many of the candidates answered
all three. The Commission rated the answers of such candidates with
an over-all penalty for failure to follow instructions. Other candidates
were rated on the one question answered as directed. In reply to a suit
attacking these curative procedures, the Commission contended that
rating with a penalty did not violate its rule requiring a standard of
100% in all tests, that the change in rating standards did not create an
illegal special test, that the penalty was ample and uniformly imposed,
and that knowledge, as distinguished from ability to follow instructions,
was primarily measured in the examination. The Appellate Division
approved these contentions and reversed the ruling of Special Term.
In Matter of Brady v. Finegan,4" a candidate for the New York City
police force had been notified of failure in the written test because of a
rating of 407 in the subject of memory. At the date of the written test,
the rules of the Commission required only 20% in each announced sub-
ject of an examination. Before release of the results of the written
test, this rule was changed to require 50% in each subject. The use of
the new rule to effect the failure of the petitioner was held by the Court
of Appeals not improperly retroactive, especially since the identity of
candidates remained undisclosed when the rule was revised. However,
in a later case,46 promotion lists for the New York City Fire Depart-
44. Matter of Immediato v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 14, 1938, p. 749, col. 4, rev'd, 254
App. Div. 672, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 994 (1st Dep't 1938). But in Rizzuto v. Kern, N. Y. L. J.,
April 17, 1940, p. 1740, col. 4, the court disapproved the Commission's procedure in reme-
dying the confusion created by conflicting instructions as to the number of questions to
be answered in a written test for Junior Assessor.
45. 269 N. Y. 571, 199 N. E. 676 (1935).
46. Matter of Wittekind v. Kern, 170 Misc. 939, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 569 (Sup. Ct. 1938),
aff'd, 256 App. Div. 918, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 862 (1st Dep't 1939), aff'd, 281 N. Y. 701, 23
N. E. (2d) 537 (1939). In Matter of Poss v. Kern, 263 App. Div. 320, 32 N. T. S. (2d)
979 (Ist Dep't 1942), modifying, N. Y. L. J., June 3, 1941, p. 2489, col. 1, the Appellate
Division invalidated lowering of the pass mark in a written test for Stationary Engineer
below the'75% standard required by Commission rule for technical examinations. The court
cited the Wittekind case as authority for the declaration that the Commission is bound
by its own rules. The decision in Matter of Brady v. Finegan, 269 N. Y. 571, 199 N. E.
676 (1935), was distinguished on the ground that there the rule had been changed by
the Commission prior to alternation of the pass mark. In Matter of Margulles v. Kern,
N. Y. L. J., Dec. 15, 1939, p. 2157, col. 5, the court permitted the Commission to withdraw




ment had been rendered inadequate because of the introduction of the
three platoon system. The Municipal Civil Service Commission there-
upon amended its rule requiring an 807o general average in examina-
tions for the Fire Department and added to the existing lists the names
of candidates who had received 70% or better in the written tests and
80% or better in record and seniority. The Commission argued such
action was not improperly retroactive, that candidates were not singled
out for favor, and that its action did not revive an expired list. Never-
theless, the courts held that the Commission's action was illegal. In
another case,4 7 about 475 persons employed in the Department of Wel-
fare as temporary attendant messengers and watchman attendants had
been excluded by the Commission from examinations for permanent
appointment to their positions because of apparent statutory prohibi-
tions. A statute enacted after these examinations were held, revealed the
eligibility of these employees under the original law. The lower courts
nevertheless held that the Commission's own rule forbade a special
examination where not requested within fifteen days after discovery of
error.4" The Court of Appeals finally declared this rule not binding where
the curative action was taken at the initiative of the Commission and
referred to the established right of an administrative agency to correct
its misinterpretations of statutes.
Experience Standards
The evaluation of the experience and training possessed by candidates
is important for many positions of responsibility. This evaluation entails
standards and tests different from those employed to measure other
qualifications and merits some discussion here. Efficient appraisal requires
rating standards that discriminate accurately but fairly. The discretions
necessarily exercised by personnel agencies in constructing and apply-
ing such standards must occasionally submit to judicial scrutiny. Where
47. Matter of Staples v. Kern, 282 N. Y. 205, 26 N. E. (2d) 20 (1940), rev'g, 257 App.
Div. 925, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 1005 (1st Dep't 1939).
48. Rule V, § IV, Para. 11 of the Rules of the New York City Civil Service Commis-
sion provides, ". . . no claim for a special test shall be allowed unless it be filed in writing
with the Commission within fifteen days after the date of the error . . . and within sixty
days after the date of said test." It is interesting to note that in a later companion case to
the Staples case, Matter of Rindone v. Marsh, 183 Misc. 10, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 450 (Sup.
Ct. 1944), the court ruled that the employees who had been denied admission to the
original examination but had passed the special test were entitled to supplant eligibles,
with lower ratings, previously appointed from the list as originally established. The court
so held despite a Commission rule, Rule V, § V, Par. 5, that ". . . such correction, in any
case, shall be without prejudice to the status of any person previously appointed as a
result of such examination."
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these experience standards are obviously inequitable, the courts should
hold them improper. But administrative law would lead to the conclu-
sion that the devising of new standards to meet judicial criticism be
left to the commission within the limits defined by the court.
In an open competitive examination for Social Investigator in the New
York City Department of Welfare, employees in the predecessor agen-
cy, the Temporary Emergency Relief Bureau, were given proportion-
ately higher experience credit on the theory presumably, that experi-
ence gained on the job was the most valuable. The propriety of these
standards was attacked by a candidate employed in a private social
agency. The Supreme Court, upholding the petitioner, directed use of
a rating scale which credited various types of social work experience
both public and private, equally. This order was approved by the Appel-
late Division,4 9 although it commented:
"It is possible that experience as an investigator for a social agency, Fed-
eral, State or Municipal, may be broader and of greater practical value than
that gained in a private social agency and might justify a difference in the
basic rating.' 0
The Appellate Division here apparently envisioned the justice of grant-
ing higher basic credit for public social work experience even though
refusing to restrict such preferential treatment to employees of a single
agency. Nevertheless, the broad ruling of Special Term was not dis-
turbed.
A written outline of a candidate's experience may afford an insuffi-
cient index to its precise quality and degree of relevance. To obtain
greater accuracy, experience-oral interviews are frequently employed.
A recent decision confirms the right of a civil service commission to
suspend judgment as to a candidate's fitness for employment until evi-
dence thereto has been adduced at the experience-oral test. The an-
nouncement of an examination for promotion to an engineering posi-
tion in the New York City service stated:
49. Sheridan v. Kern, 255 App. Div. 57, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 336 (Ist Dep't 1930).
50. Id. at 60, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) at 339. In a later case, Matter of Fogarty v. Kern, 259
App. Div. 524, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 824 (1st Dep't 1940), rating standards granting higher
credit for experience in public than in private social agencies in an examination for Assistant
Supervisor in the same Department of Welfare, were approved after appeal. The Appellate
Division there explained, in 524 N. Y. S. (2d) at 827: "The commission shows by affidavit
that, for a variety of reasons, experience with public agencies is more closely related to
the work of supervisors, grade 2, in the department of welfare and will be more valuable
than experience with private agencies. Since the action of the commission is justified
by these rational considerations concerning the relative value of such previous experience
the courts ought not to interfere."
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"Experience will be rated after an oral interview to determine the extent
that such experience has qualified the candidate for this position."
The petitioner had been admitted conditionally and his experience
paper stamped "Admitted to examination pending further inquiry and
determination of your experience qualification." After passing the writ-
ten test, he was failed at the experience-oral interview when question-
ing disclosed his experience unsuitable for the duties of the position.
Although the right to suspend final decision until an adequate basis for
judgment is available constitutes a necessary prerogative of adminis-
trative agencies, the Supreme Court ruled that admission to the examina-
tion entitled the petitioner to a satisfactory rating in experience.5 This
ruling was reversed by the Appellate Division with the comment:
"Clearly, mere admission to the examination would not entitle a court to
direct that a passing mark be given to the petitioner. To do this would remove
entirely the discretion vested in the Civil Service examiners to determine
whether the candidate was qualified. '52
Eligible Lists
The review of civil service procedures does not terminate with the
conclusion of the examination itself. The courts have further consid-
ered the manner in which eligible lists resulting from an examination
are established and used.53
The contrasting results in two recent cases involving the setting up
of eligible lists stress the value of an adequate record and justification
51. Matter of Kanen v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., June 29, 1940, p. 2933, col. 4, rev'd, 260
App. Div. 500, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 98 (1st Dep't 1940).
52. Id. at 502, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) at 100.
53. For some interesting cases on this subject, see Matter of Benline v. Marsh, N. Y. L. J.,
June 19, 1942, p. 2597, col. 7 (creation of special eligible list containing names of eligibles
on original list who possessed additional skill or training not tested in examination ap-
proved); Matter of Kroyer v. Conway, 268 App. Div. 361, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 707 (3d
Dep't 1944) (refusal of State Civil Service Commission to certify eligible on reinstate-
ment list for senior attorney in Transit Commission to position of senior attorney in De-
partment of Taxation and Finance approved); Matter of Waters v. Buck, - Misc. -, 36
N. Y. S. (2d) 834 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd, 265 App. Div. 344, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 377
(1st Dep't 1942), aff'd without opinion, 290 N. Y. 840, 50 N. E. (2d) 239 (1943) (promo-
tion to another department from a city-wide promotion list held to terminate previous
seniority); Hirsch v. Marsh, 178 Misc. 556, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (use
of a register, established merely for convenience of Mayor in selecting City Marshals, to
fill competitive positions of Deputy Sheriff held improper); Poss v. Kern, 263 App. Div.
320, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 979 (1942), modifying N. Y. L. J., June 3, 1941, p. 2489, col. 1
(establishment of separate lists for Stationary Engineer (Steam) and Stationary Engineer
(Electric) held improper where advertisement of examination had announced that all
candidates would be required to qualify in both steam and electric specialties).
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of discretions exercised by personnel agencies if such discretions are
to be sustained in the courts. In People ex rel. Sweeney v. Rice" the
creation of separate eligible lists for steno-typists and for manual sten-
ographers from the results of a single examination conducted by the
New York State Civil Service Commission was held improper because
no adequate explanation was shown of the need for this procedure. How-
ever, in a somewhat sinilar case involving the New York City Commis-
sion, the Supreme Court approved the Commission's contentions, re-
inforced by adequate evidence, that the readier transcription and more
permanent nature of steno-typed notes rendered steno-typists more suit-
able for certain positions.55
The New York Civil Service Law permits use of appropriate lists
where there is no eligible list bearing the title of the position. 6 Under
this law the courts in one case ruled that the need for a post-entry train-
ing course in the duties of Laundry Bath Attendant precluded use of an
Attendant (Female) list. 7 But in a later case,58 the appointment of
eligibles from an Automobile Engineman list as street-car operators was
54. 279 N. Y. 70, 17 N. E. (2d) 772 (1938).
55. Matter of Goldstein v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., October 28, 1939, p. 1362, col 2. For other
cases on this subject, see note 53 supra.
56. Section 14, New York Civil Service Law, which reads in part"... Appointment
shall be made from the eligible list most nearly appropriate for the group in which the
position to be filled is classified, and a new list shall be created for a stated position or
group of positions only when there is no appropriate list existing from which appoint-
ment may be made."
57. Matter of Krapp v. Kern, 255 App. Div. 305, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 499 (1st Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 281 N. Y. 617, 22 N. E. (2d) 176 (1939).
58. Matter of Lennon v. Delaney, 263 App. Div. 568, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 401 (1st Dep't
1942). See also Matter of James v. Kern, N. Y. L. J., May 2, 1940, p. 1998, col. 5 (eligible
list for attendant-messenger held properly certified as appropriate list to fill position of
porter in New York City Transit System although a short training course usually given ap-
pointees before permanent assignment). See also Matter of Henry Hudson Parkway Au-
thority v. Kern, 167 Misc. 699, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div.
770, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 572 (Ist Dep't 1938); Matter of Friend v. Valentine, N. Y. L. J.,
Nov. 2, 1940, p. 1386, col. 3, revz'd, 261 App. Div. 163, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 620 (1st Dep't
1941), aff'd, 285 N. Y. 764, 34 N. E. (2d) 912 (1941); Matter of Ackerman v. Kern, 281
N. Y. 87, 22 N. E. (2d) 247 (1939). The question sometimes arises as to whether appoint-
ment to an appropriate position justified removal of the appointee from the eligible list.
In Matter of Luria v. Marsh, 178 Misc. 595, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 798 (Sup. Ct. 1942), re-
moval of the names of eligibles who had been appointed to appropriate positions equivalent
in salary and responsibility to that for which the'list had been established was upheld
especially since the eligibles affected had consented to the removal. The court indicated
that appointment to an appropriate position of lower grade would not justify re-
moval of the names of the appointees from the list. See also Matter of Aliotta v. Finegan,
N. Y. L. J., July 13, 1937, p. 118, col. 2, affd without opinion, 253 App. Div. 810, 300
N. Y. Supp. 1332 (1st Dep't 1937).
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approved although a twenty-hour training course was given before per-
manent assignments. It appears difficult to reconcile these decisions.
Conclusion
This glimpse at several aspects of public personnel practice may have
yielded a picture of the uncertainties and perplexities that still surround
the application of principles of administrative law in civil service litiga-
tion. The ever-growing importance of a well-trained body of public em-
ployees and the emergence of more complex personnel procedures make
the reviewing function of the courts a more significant as well as a more
difficult one. Personnel agencies can assist the orderly growth of ad-
ministrative law in their field by formulating policies only after consult-
ing tenets already established in the decisions of the courts, by educating
their staffs in correlating their functions, as exercised, with controlling
statutes and decisions, and, finally, by submitting to the courts clear-
cut convincing evidence of the grounds for administrative decisions.
Courts may make a contribution by observing judicial restraint.
Reconversion and post-war readjustment promise difficulties for pub-
lic personnel agencies. Administrative law, once firmly established and
resolutely heeded by administrators no less than by the courts, can help
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